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Abstract 
Since the 1990s, the idea that accidents should be reduced to zero is gaining growing 
acclaim in the fields of road safety and occupational safety and health. As most of the 
literature on this so-called Zero Accident Vision (ZAV) deals exclusively with its application to 
road safety, which is a public sector responsibility, there is a need to learn more about the 
way it is implemented by private companies. This paper reports on a case study into the 
zero accident approach followed by steel company Tata Steel IJmuiden (the Netherlands). 
The study suggests that private sector advocates of the ZAV, unlike their public sector 
counterparts, tend to view safety aspirations and economic considerations as mutually 
reinforcing. However, it is shown that this harmony model does not entirely hold in practice. 
The findings also highlight another discrepancy. Characteristic of the ZAV is a systems-
theoretic focus on identifying root causes of unsafe situations rather than on individual 
error and blame. Yet employee behavior appears to be a major target for Tata’s safety 
policy and several managers insist on punishing unsafe behavior. Paradoxically, this punitive 
tendency seems partly stimulated by and at the same time could hinder the very ambition 
of eradicating all accidents.  
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1. Introduction 
It is almost commonplace, today, to say that western societies have become increasingly 
risk averse (cf. e.g. Burgess, 2011; Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Furedi, 2009; Scott, 2000). A 
specific expression of this development is the growing importance of the so-called Vision 
Zero or Zero Accident Vision (ZAV), which aspires to a world without severe and fatal 
accidents, or, in some versions, even without accidents at all. Since being introduced in the 
1990s, the ZAV and similar philosophies have been adopted in several countries across 
different continents (Sherratt, 2014; Swuste, Albrechtsen, & Hovden, 2012; Young, 2014). 
The ZAV is best known as a (Scandinavian) road safety program, but is also being applied in 
the field of occupational safety and health (Zwetsloot et al., 2013). A growing number of 
companies are committing themselves to the pursuit of zero accidents and, in countries 
such as Finland, Germany and the Netherlands, share best practices in Zero Accident 
Networks (Partnership for European Research in Occupational Safety and Health, 2014; 
Zwetsloot et al., 2013). 
The rise of the ZAV has not gone unnoticed in the scientific literature. However, most of the 
available literature deals exclusively with the ZAV in road safety (e.g. Elvebakk & Steiro, 
2009; Fahlquist, 2006; Johansson, 2009; Rosencrantz, Edvardsson, & Hansson, 2007). Much 
less attention has been paid to the implementation of the ZAV as an occupational safety 
philosophy in the private sectora. Recently, some empirical studies have been published 
about the ZAV in this rather unknown application area (e.g. Sherratt, 2014; Young, 2014), 
but there is a need for more research (cf. Zwetsloot et al., 2013).  
Two questions are especially worthy of investigation. The first has to do with the ethical 
content of the ZAV and its alleged neglect of economic laws. In a discussion of the 
Scandinavian zero accident approach to road safety, Elvik (1999) criticizes the reasoning that 
the moral unacceptability of traffic fatalities forbids that cost be a barrier to reducing the 
number of traffic fatalities as far as possible. According to Elvik, the economic law of 
diminishing marginal returns implies that it would be more reasonable to stop spending 
extra money on road safety at some point, as this money could save more lives when spent 
in other ways, such as on health care. Since road safety is traditionally a public sector 
responsibility and hence not subject to free market considerations such as profit and 
returns, there is ground to hypothesize that the ZAV’s disregard for economic rationality is 
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typical for its application in the public sector and does not, or to a lesser extent, apply in the 
private sector. Our question is therefore: How does the ZAV in the private sector relate to 
economic considerations? 
The second question concerns the tension between the zero accident approach and another 
way of responding to unsafe situations, that is, by punishing those who err or break the 
rules. The ZAV takes a system approach in which the primary responsibility lies with the 
designers of a system, not with the system users. Unsafe behavior is perceived as a 
symptom of underlying problems with the system, at least when not originating in bad 
intent or gross recklessness, and taking refuge in blaming individuals for such behavior is 
rejected (Langeland, 2009; Tingvall & Haworth, 1999; Young, 2014). However, blaming 
individuals for unsafe behavior is a response that has deep roots in western culture and still 
holds considerable appeal (Dekker, 2012; Dekker & Nyce, 2012). Dekker (2011) even argues 
that the tendency to criminalize human error, as he calls it, is on the rise. Furthermore, it 
could be argued that there is an association between a zero accident strategy and a zero 
tolerance policy (cf. Sherratt, 2014), which would mean that striving for zero accidents 
provides a sort of intuitive stimulus to blame unsafe behavior of individuals, 
notwithstanding the ZAV´s explicit rejection of blaming individuals. This begs the empirical 
question of whether companies that apply the ZAV manage to resist the temptation to 
criminalize human error on the part of their employees.                   
This paper contributes to the empirical knowledge on the implementation of the ZAV in the 
private sector and to answering the two questions outlined above. It does so by presenting 
and analyzing the results of a case study into the zero accident approach followed by steel 
multinational Tata Steel on its site in IJmuiden, the Netherlands. The case study consists of 
semi-structured interviews with more than twenty managers from three different levels, a 
survey among employees below the level of middle management, and an analysis of 
relevant company documents.  
In the remainder of this section we provide a further introduction into the responses to 
unsafe situations we just described: the Zero Accident Vision and what we will call, following 
Dekker (2011), the approach of criminalizing human error. After that, we describe the 
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methodology of this study in more detail. In the next section, the results are presented. 
These results are discussed in the last section of the paper, which also contains conclusions.  
1.1. Zero Accident Vision 
As touched upon before, most of the thinking and writing about the ZAV thus far has taken 
place within the context of road safety. We briefly discuss the most relevant elements from 
this body of knowledge and compare these with what is known about the ZAV in the private 
sector. Furthermore, we take a look at the broader context of the ZAV.  
Whitelegg and Haq (2006) characterize the ZAV as ethical in nature, since it refuses to 
accept lifelong suffering or human death as a result of traffic accidents. This refusal entails 
an unorthodox allocation of responsibility. Although the role of road users in avoiding traffic 
accidents is not denied, they are not, like in traditional approaches, deemed primarily or 
solely responsible for road safety. Instead, the responsibility for safety is skewed toward the 
designers and administrators of the system, because of their supposed capability to change 
the parameters of the system so as to achieve the goal of ‘zero’. User disobedience, 
negligence or failure to understand the rules do not reduce the responsibility of the system 
designers and administrators, but are considered indicators that show where system 
improvement is needed (Fahlquist, 2006). In Sweden, where the road safety version of the 
ZAV was first adopted, this distribution of responsibility has been laid down in the following 
rules: 
1. The designers of the system are always ultimately responsible for the level of safety 
within the entire road transport system. 
2. Road users are responsible for following the rules set by the system designers. 
3. If road users fail to obey these rules for whatever reason, the system designers are 
required to take necessary further steps to prevent people from getting injured or killed 
(cited in Tingvall & Haworth, 1999, p. 2).  
An important assumption of the zero accident approach to road safety is that human error 
cannot entirely be excluded. The road transport system therefore needs to be arranged 
such that the consequences of human error do not exceed the resilience of the human body 
(Langeland, 2009; Whitelegg & Haq, 2006). In other words, the road environment ought to 
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be forgiving of mistakes by road users (Bax, De Jong & Koppenjan, 2010; Tingvall & Haworth, 
1999). 
Not everyone is convinced that the forgiveness of the system can be raised to the extent 
necessary to actually reach the goal of zero serious injuries and fatalities. Some authors 
have argued that the ZAV is no more than an image of a desired future, whose function lies 
in appealing to those individuals who have the ability to improve things (Elvebakk & Steiro, 
2009; Langeland, 2009). However, scientists involved in the ZAV argue that it should not 
merely be perceived as a representation of a desired future, but as a scientific goal that is 
set to be achieved (Langeland, 2009; Rosencrantz et al., 2007). 
The debate on the character and attainability of the road safety ZAV shows that referring to 
it in the singular is a bit artificial. As the authors writing about this approach and the 
countries that have adopted it do not always agree in their interpretations and elaborations, 
the road safety ZAV has in fact different versions. When we turn to the ZAV in the context of 
the private sector, it is even more difficult to give a clear description of its content. Thus far, 
efforts to define the corporate ZAV have been scarce and, due to its application in a large 
number of companies, its potential for varying interpretations exceeds that of the road 
safety ZAV.  
Notwithstanding these difficulties, attempts to discover the common core of zero accident 
approaches in the private sector reveal obvious similarities with the ZAV in the road safety 
context. Like the road safety ZAV, the corporate ZAV is motivated by ethical considerations. 
Zwetsloot et al. (2013, p. 46) see a connection between the ZAV and the paradigm of 
Corporate Social Responsibility, and call accident free workplaces ‘the only ethically 
sustainable safety goal’. Debate about whether the ZAV is to be seen as a concrete target or 
rather a strategy to raise commitment to safety is also apparent in the literature on the 
corporate ZAV (Sherratt, 2014; Swuste et al., 2012; Zwetsloot et al., 2013). Furthermore, 
there is correspondence between the zero accident approaches in both domains with 
respect to the shift in responsibility toward system designers and administrators. Different 
authors emphasize that pursuing the corporate ZAV requires leadership of the management 
of companies and paying attention to systemic causes of accidents rather than to 
individuals’ actions (Young, 2014; Zwetsloot et al., 2013).      
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However, there seems to be a difference regarding the scope of the responsibility that 
system users retain. According to Zwetsloot et al. (2013, p. 45), ‘without the personal 
commitment of every individual person in the company, ZAV cannot be realized’. In the zero 
accident approach to road safety, system users appear to have been assigned a less crucial 
role. Although the obligation of road users to follow the rules is explicitly articulated, the 
success of the ZAV is not made dependent upon the commitment of every road user. 
Instead, efforts are aimed at designing a road transport system in which even the not-so-
committed will cause little or no harm (cf. e.g. Tingvall & Haworth, 1999). There is some 
logic in this difference between both versions of the ZAV, as it seems easier for the 
management of a company to promote the commitment of every employee than for the 
administrators of a road transport system to promote the commitment of every road user 
(cf. Langeland, 2009).   
The observation that system users in the corporate ZAV retain a crucial role would mean 
that the shift in responsibility toward system designers and administrators in this field is less 
radical than in the road safety ZAV. From this perspective, it is no coincidence that the 
principles presented by Zwanikken and Zwetsloot (2012) as the core of the corporate ZAV 
place much less emphasis on the responsibility of the system designers than the Swedish 
rules cited above. The principles of Zwanikken and Zwetsloot read as follows:                
1. All accidents can be prevented. 
2. Every accident is unacceptable.  
3. The management proactively advertises that every accident must be prevented. 
4. Learning from accidents is considered key to the success of the ZAV (our translation). 
Although the ZAV in its different forms dates from the 1990s, it is rooted in a much older 
way of thinking about human behavior, error and safety, which is referred to as the 
environmental hypothesis. The environmental hypothesis perceives the actions of an 
individual in the broader context of the surrounding environment. It can be traced to the 
work of Crystal Eastman, at the beginning of the twentieth century, who attributed 
accidents to different environmental factors such as working conditions, high production 
pressure, fatigue, heat, noise and inexperience (Swuste, Van Gulijk, & Zwaard, 2010). In the 
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1920s, Lewis Deblois followed up on this line of reasoning and argued that not the worker, 
but the management is ultimately responsible for a lack of safety. He also perceived 
accidents to be the result of a sequence of events and argued that they should be 
investigated as such (Swuste, Van Gulijk, & Zwaard, 2009; Van Gulijk, Swuste, Ale, & Zwaard, 
2009). 
Reason (2000) refers to the environmental hypothesis as the system approach and 
highlights the following implications: (1) errors are to be expected, because humans are 
fallible; (2) errors are to be viewed as consequences rather than causes; (3) human errors 
highlight traps in the workplace, therefore, not who made the mistake is important, but how 
and why this happened and what can be done to prevent it. 
With its emphasis on the preventability and unacceptability of every accident, the ZAV adds 
to the tradition of environmental thinking a certain utopian flavor. This addition, the ‘zero’ 
element, brings yet another tradition to the attention. According to Zwetsloot et al. (2013), 
the ZAV is part of a family of ‘zero visions’. Some other members of this family are the 
visions of zero defects, zero wastes, and zero emissions. Interestingly, Zwetsloot et al. argue 
that these zero visions do not only have ethical kinship, but also have in common that they 
were initially criticized for being unrealistic or too expensive, while later on business cases 
proved to be realistic. The zero defects movement, for instance, demonstrated that the 
costs of low quality were much higher than the costs for generating better quality. By 
analogy, Zwetsloot et al. suggest that the costs of a lack of safety are higher than the costs 
connected to the pursuit of zero accidents. This would mean that besides ethical 
considerations there are good economic reasons for adopting the ZAV.  
1.2. Criminalizing human error 
The tradition of environmental thinking, with the ZAV as a particular form, can to a certain 
extent be seen as a correction to an individualized way of dealing with unsafe behavior. The 
individual hypothesis, as Swuste et al. (2010) call it, has just like the environmental 
hypothesis a venerable history. In the tradition of the individual hypothesis, accidents were 
viewed as the result of a poor execution by individual employees of given orders (Guarnieri, 
1992). Scientists therefore tried to identify ‘susceptible workers’, individuals who had an 
above average chance to be involved in an accident. This line of reasoning resulted in the 
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first scientific safety theory, the accident proneness theory, which was initiated by the work 
of Greenwood and Woods in 1919 (De Winter, 2014; Rodgers & Blanchard, 1993; Swuste et 
al., 2010).  
Reason (2000) uses the term person approach to refer to the individual hypothesis. He 
argues that followers of this approach view errors as moral issues and subscribe to the just 
world hypothesis, which states that bad things happen to bad people. The person approach 
is embedded in the idea of free will; human behavior is perceived as a rational, conscious 
decision making progress. Safety transgressions can therefore be attributed to the individual 
and punishment poses as an effective way to respond to human error. In this sense, 
punishment represents the means to the end of preventing human error. So, the approach 
of criminalizing human error can be considered a manifestation of the person approach or 
individual hypothesis. According to Dekker (2011), error has come to be viewed as a failure 
of character. He states that thinking in terms of human error implies negligence (how can 
there be error without it?). Holding someone accountable for his errors is based on the 
utilitarian idea that punishing one person will ultimately ensure the safety of the rest of the 
population (Dekker, 2003). Punishing one to prevent an error or rule transgression, is in 
accordance to the rational choice paradigm. Proponents of the rational choice theory will 
argue that punishment is a cost item in the cost-benefit analysis which precedes any rule 
transgression. In this view, punishment can operate as a measure taken to either deter the 
offender, or discourage his peers to exhibit similar behavior.  
Yet, this is not the only way by which the use of punishment can be explained. Reason 
(2000) argues that the person approach is based on other grounds as well. Blaming 
individuals rather than targeting institutions would simply be more emotionally satisfying 
and seeking to uncouple a worker’s unsafe act from institutional responsibility would be in 
the interest of managers. A broader observation on punishment comes from Garland (1990, 
1991), who describes it as a social phenomenon in the context of social life. He writes that 
although there is no reason to expect an overall positive effect from punishment, it remains 
an important institution within our society. Rather than a means to an end, Garland argues 
punishment to be an expressive institution, an emotional response. According to him, 
punishment lies at the basis of our social order and operates as the ultimate manifestation 
of her power. This suggests that at a sub-rational level criminalizing human error has a 
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stronger appeal to people than the systems-oriented approach to human error advocated in 
the ZAV. 
2. Method 
2.1. Data collection 
As was stated before, the data collection took place at Tata Steel IJmuiden in the 
Netherlands. Tata Steel IJmuiden is one of several companies in the Netherlands that have 
publicly committed themselves to the goal of zero occupational accidents (Tata Steel 
IJmuiden, 2013c; Zero Accidents Network, 2015). The company was selected because of its 
willingness to grant the researcher access to employees from all levels of the organizational 
hierarchy.  
All data were collected by one researcher, the first author of this paper. The research was 
carried out from May to July 2013. The main research method involved conducting 
interviews. Potential respondents were selected by means of a priori selection and the 
snowball method. They were explained the purpose of the study and were invited to 
participate in a one hour semi-structured interview. The company provided the researcher 
with the opportunity to start the research by interviewing some of the top executives within 
the business unit ‘Strip Products Mainland Europe’ and to descend the hierarchical ladder 
from there. Subsequent research within the business unit was done within three 
departments: ‘Manufacturing Iron & Steel’, ‘Manufacturing Rolling & Coating’ and 
‘Engineering & Site Services’. Twenty-five Tata employees were approached to part-take in 
the research, 23 of them consented to do so. Incidentally, three interviews were conducted 
with Tata employees who fall outside the hierarchical chain just described. Their selection 
was the result of the snowball method. Most interviews were recorded with a voice-
recorder and subsequently transcribed for further analysis. When recording the interview 
proved impossible, extensive notes were taken during the interview. As most interviews 
were in Dutch, the quotations used in this paper were translated to English.    
To enable a categorization of the statements that Tata respondents made and to view the 
acquired information within the right context, the respondents are classified into three 
groups. The classification of the respondents into either one of these three groups is done in 
accordance to their position. Group one can be described as ‘top management’: Individuals 
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in this group hold an executive position at Tata Steel IJmuiden. Group two is defined as 
‘senior management’: The individuals who belong to this group bear the responsibility for 
one of the many divisions within the three departments that were mentioned. The third 
group is classified as ‘middle management’: Individuals who have been categorized into this 
group are responsible for a specific part of one of the divisions. They are for example in 
charge of production or technical maintenance or fulfill a managerial position at a project. 
The semi-structured interviews covered various safety related topics: (the interviewee’s) 
general opinion on safety, prevention (measures, perceived obstacles, reach), disciplinary 
action (nature of transgressions, responding to undesired behavior, use of punitive 
measures), company culture (acceptable and unacceptable behavior, addressing undesired 
behavior, safety reports), incidents (definitions), dealing with incidents (responding to, 
investigating, looking for cause or blame), external influences on safety policy (third parties, 
regulations, outside contractors on site), vision on safety (returns and investments, future 
developments, reaching zero, role of disciplinary action).  
The second research method adopted is that of a survey. In order to get a better 
understanding of the way in which the policies created by the managers are experienced on 
the work floor, a questionnaire was administered among the employees operating below 
the middle management level. All of these employees work at one of the plants in IJmuiden 
as either a factory worker, team leader or duty officer. They are subject to the safety policy 
and are supervised by some of the respondents that were interviewed. The questionnaire 
focused on the topic of safety commitment, safety regulations and deviation from the rules. 
Seven divisions were approached and asked for permission to distribute the questionnaire. 
Three of these divisions authorized the request. After consulting with the responsible 
managers, the number of questionnaires that could be distributed was agreed upon. The 
respondents of each division were selected at random. The vast majority was approached 
via e-mail, a small number by paper questionnaire. A week after the first e-mail, those 
respondents who had not yet filled out the questionnaire, received a second e-mail to 
remind them of the pending request. After another two weeks, the non-responders 
received a final reminder and were given a full month to grant this request. In the end, a 
total number of 197 invitations were sent, 64 of these questionnaires were returned, setting 
the average response at 32%. The vast majority (79.7%) of these participants has been 
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working for Tata Steel for over five years, but no more than 10. Nearly 44% holds a 
managerial function.  
The questionnaire consisted of 53 multiple choice questions. Apart from the introductory 
questions, it had a response scale which consisted of five categories: ‘agree’, ‘slightly agree’, 
‘neutral’, ‘slightly disagree’, and ‘disagree’. Respondents were asked to respond to various 
statements regarding their own behavior, observed behavior of colleagues and regarding 
the company’s safety policy. For example: ‘I always report unsafe situations’, ‘My colleagues 
follow all safety procedures as closely as possible’, ‘The investigation of a safety incident 
serves to identify the cause of the incident’ (full questionnaire available on request). 
The third research method was a content analysis. The analysis involved public documents 
such as annual reports, sustainability reports, the company websites and documents 
attained via respondents (e.g. material used for informing and training employees in the 
field of safety). 
2.2. Data analysis 
The analysis of the interview data (559 pages of transcripts and notes) roughly took place in 
two phases. In the initial coding phase (Charmaz, 2014), raw research data were labeled 
using informant terms, concepts, and terms from everyday life. For example, managers tried 
to explain the occurrence of unsafe behavior. Some of the codes used to label their 
explanations were: ‘short-cut (production pressure)’, ‘short-cut (laziness)’, ‘craftsmanship’, 
‘resistance to rules’, ‘occupational blindness’.  
The large number of codes that emerged during the initial phase was assembled and 
reduced to a more manageable number of themes in the phase of focused coding (Charmaz, 
2014). The aforementioned codes, for example, were assigned to the theme ‘employee 
attitude and behavior’. We then also started going back and forth between the data, 
concepts, themes and the literature to make sense of the larger picture. The actual coding 
was undertaken by the first author and discussed with the second author during several 
meetings.  
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Tata Steel IJmuiden  
Tata Steel Limited was established in 1907 and is part of Tata Group which consists of over 100 
companies in different business sectors. Tata Steel is among the top ten global steelmakers in the 
world and is the second largest steel company in Europe. The company has named ‘excellence in 
health and safety’ a key business imperative (Tata Steel Limited, 2013a, p. 44). Tata Steel Limited has 
manufacturing operations in 26 countries and is commercially present in over 50 countries. The 
larger production facilities are situated in countries such as India, Thailand, Singapore, China and 
Australia, but also on the European continent, namely in the UK and the Netherlands. The part of the 
company that is operating in Europe formerly went by the name ‘Corus’ (Tata Steel Limited,  2013b). 
Data collection for this paper has been carried out at one specific European location: Tata Steel 
IJmuiden, in the Netherlands.  
Tata Steel employs 11,000 people in the Netherlands. The vast majority of employees work in 
IJmuiden (about 9,000), but the company also operates in other locations, such as Maastricht, 
Oosterhout, Nieuwegein and Moerdijk. The industrial complex in IJmuiden is situated north of the 
North Sea Canal, it covers about 750 hectares of land and is within the territory of the municipalities 
of Beverwijk, Velsen and Heemskerk. The IJmuiden location features its own port and thus stands in 
direct connection to the North Sea (Tata Steel IJmuiden, 2011a, 2013a). It produced 6,6 million tons 
of crude steel during the financial year 2012-2013 (Tata Steel Limited, 2013a, p. 60). The steel that is 
produced in IJmuiden is used for different purposes, for example the automotive, construction and 
packaging industry. The IJmuiden location is home to a number of business units, such as ‘Strip 
Products’, ‘Packaging Steel’ and ‘Research, Development & Technology’. 
On its website, Tata Steel IJmuiden insists that safety is of top priority. This statement is supported 
by the aspiration of having no more than zero accidents. The slogan that is used to spread this 
message reads: ‘We do it safe, or we don’t do it at all’ (Tata Steel IJmuiden, 2013c). Furthermore, the 
company states that its focus on safety does not end with the well-being of its own employees but 
also includes the well-being of external employees, such as firm personnel working on the Tata 
premises. Working on the industrial site implies being in a risk environment and according to the 
company’s philosophy, it is Tata’s responsibility to constitute a working environment that allows 
employees to reach their retirement in good health (Tata Steel IJmuiden, 2013d). 
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3. Results 
In this section, we present the findings of our case study. First, we describe the 
considerations of Tata Steel’s managers in pursuing zero accidents. Second, we discuss the 
managers’ view on the role of employee attitude and behavior in the occurance and 
prevention of accidents. Next, we outline the responsibilities of managers and employees in 
dealing with unsafe situations, both proactively and reactively. The section ends with an 
identification of punitive elements in the company’s policy in action.  
3.1. Pursuing zero 
The top management at Tata Steel IJmuiden indicates that it pursues a uniform safety policy 
across its site. The overarching goal that it has set for the organization is zero Lost Time 
Injuries (LTI: an occurrence that minimally results in lost time from work for one day or 
shift). This coincides with the first three corporate ZAV principles, which designate accidents 
as preventable and unacceptable (Zwanikken & Zwetsloot, 2012). Furthermore, the top 
management indicates that it attests to the common-cause hypothesis, which states that 
pathways of near-misses are similar to pathways of actual accidents (cf. Wright & Van der 
Schaaf, 2004). Therefore, the pursuit of zero involves a broader effort. It does not just cover 
LTI related incidents, but any unsafe situation is regarded as unacceptable. 
The top managers state that the objective of zero LTI has not been imposed upon the 
organization from the outside, but is based on an intrinsic conviction. The interviews show 
that this conviction is mainly driven by two considerations. The first consideration is ethical 
in nature: Providing workers with a safe environment is seen as an essential condition of 
employment by the top management as well as the senior and middle management. The 
management therefore argues zero to be the only possible ambition a company can set for 
itself; setting the bar at one or more accidents is considered inexplicable. The ethical 
character of this consideration is clearly reflected in the following statements: 
I think we owe it to our people and I owe it to my conscience (senior manager). 
Man is the most fragile thing we have, so it’s good that’s what we put emphasis on (middle 
manager). 
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The second consideration has an economic basis. Zero LTI means one avoids all the costs 
involved with the occurrence of occupational injuries. However, this is only part of the 
consideration. Several managers also point out that the achievement of zero requires a high 
degree of what they refer to as ‘process control’. They argue that successful safety 
management is intertwined with controlling for other factors, such as efficiency and product 
quality. Therefore, rather than an item of expense, safety is regarded as an investment. As a 
top manager puts it: 
It also yields money, because you can only work safely if you attain a certain degree of 
organization in your work, which does not only pay off in safety, but also in efficiency and 
effectiveness and quality, and a safe factory is a neat and tidy factory, and in a neat and tidy 
factory you make more good products and you make them right the first time. It is about 
overall efficiency. 
There have been discussions about whether or not the ZAV is an attainable goal in practice. 
Most managers at Tata deny this to be the case. They perceive the zero as something that 
can never be permanently achieved, although some underscore that the zero can be held 
for extended periods of time. More importantly, not the goal, but the commitment to the 
goal is considered the most important factor in pursuing the ZAV: 
I’m not concerned about whether or not it is feasible; what’s important is that we do 
everything we can to get there (senior manager). 
3.2. Influencing attitude and behavior 
The top management of Tata Steel makes two important assumptions about its employees. 
First of all, employees are perceived to be individuals who intrinsically want to work in a 
safe manner. The second assumption follows from the first one: If a safety incident does 
transpire, its occurrence was not the intention of the employee(s) involved. This is not to say 
that employee behavior does not contribute to an incident, but the contribution is seen as 
merely a direct cause and not the underlying root cause to the incident. It serves as 
evidence that the management has not succeeded in conveying their safety message well 
enough, or failed to design an optimal system. According to one top manager, an in-depth 
investigation into an accident will reveal ‘in 100% of all cases’ management related root 
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causes. This leads him to the conclusion that if the management had done a proper job, 
there would have been no root causes and therefore no direct causes either.    
Notwithstanding the focus on root causes, the management of Tata addresses direct causes 
as well. Managers throughout the organization designate employee attitude and behavior 
as the most important direct causes to a lack of safety. The following quotes illustrate the 
importance attributed to these factors:    
All accidents are for 98% related to attitude and behavior (…), that is what we see (top 
manager). 
Ninety-nine percent of occupational safety has to do with behavior, and behavior can be 
influenced (senior manager). 
As a consequence, preventive programs at Tata are characterized by a strong focus upon 
employee attitude and behavior. Yet, none of the respondents gave a clear definition of 
what these concepts were supposed to mean and most of them used ‘attitude and 
behavior’ as a singular concept. Despite the absence of a clear operationalization, attitude 
and behavior are targeted for the purpose of improving risk-awareness and the degree of 
ownership among employees. Employees are to become more conscious of the risks they 
take as stronger risk-awareness would enable them to ‘sense’ when (undesirable) risks are 
being taken. A senior manager gives this example: 
If I’m not wearing a helmet, immediately a sixth sense is telling you something is wrong. 
Ownership is described as a display of employee responsibility and involvement in the 
company, which is expected to improve the willingness of employees to proactively 
cooperate with changes. As with the topic of process control, ownership on the part of 
employees is alleged to contribute to safety but also to yield other benefits:  
The more ownership grows, not just of safety but also when it’s about installations and the 
well-being of workers, the more you see those things as a common interest, the better it gets 
(…). Knowledge, the level of responsibility, ownership should be raised. Then, safety, 
production performance, environmental performance will all head in the right direction 
(senior manager). 
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The importance that the interviewed managers attach to a sense of ownership within the 
company makes clear that their acceptance of responsibility for a safe working environment 
is not meant to inhibit workers from taking responsibility. On the contrary, the management 
wants all workers to incorporate safety fully into their daily practices. So, while the 
company’s safety policy is focused on the functioning of the system as a whole, the worker 
as user and part of the system also receives a lot of attention. In order to come closer to the 
challenging goal of zero LTI it is deemed vital that every individual worker joins the effort. In 
the words of a top manager: 
Take responsibility yourself, nothing is easier than to say: someone in charge should do 
something about this. 
3.3. Responsibilities in proactive safety management 
The influencing of attitude and behavior at Tata Steel IJmuiden occurs in two stages: the 
proactive and the reactive stage (prior or in response to a safety incident). Each stage 
involves certain responsibilities for both the manager as system designer (top-down) and 
the workers as system user (bottom-up). This approach, as explained by Tata’s managers, is 
depicted in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1: Safety management responsibilities 
 
As regards the proactive management of safety at Tata Steel, the management 
responsibilities can be grouped into three activities: non-verbal as well as verbal 
communication and the allocation of resources. Conveying the safety message in a non-
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verbal way is considered important. It is also  referred to as ‘demonstrated leadership’ and 
is meant to show employees that the management does not just preach the safety message, 
but also exhibits the proper behavior. The simplest example is showing exemplary safety 
behavior. Through it, norms become known, whereas by not setting the right example, the 
safety message is considered lost. The following quote from a middle manager illustrates 
this: 
It has to do with yourself as well. There is my helmet, I always wear ear protection. It is about 
showcasing the safety message. I believe that as a manager, you have that responsibility 
(middle manager). 
Another example of non-verbal responsibilities involves the (management) safety inspection 
rounds: the obligation top and senior managers throughout the company have bestowed 
upon themselves to visit the workplace to convey the safety message, supervise work safety 
and engage in dialogues with workers on the topic of safety. By performing these tasks 
themselves rather than delegating them, the management demonstrates its involvement in 
safety. 
The safety message is also radiated through verbal communication. Managers consider it 
important to explain or discuss the need for rules that are unclear to workers and value 
learning why rules sometimes encounter resistance. Workers are informed about safety 
regulations, but also reminded of them prior to the start of an assignment. Other examples 
are: informing workers about safety expectations, showing involvement in daily problems 
and supervision. The diverse functions of this kind of interaction – getting insight into the 
employees’ perspectives as well as conveying a message - are reflected in these two 
quotations:  
We want employees to engage in a discussion with us, so we can understand which dilemmas 
they are facing (top manager).  
We properly explain something the first time, then we keep repeating and confirming what 
we have told them. All of it is meant to prevent having to asking someone after an incident: 
‘didn’t you know about….?’ (middle manager). 
A third element in the top-down responsibilities involves the provision of resources. 
Resources are a prerequisite to starting work safely. They can take different forms: physical 
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(Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), fences or walkways), technical (safety engineering), 
providing risk- and safety related information (e.g. tool boxes), mandating risk analysis and 
providing the tools for it (e.g. Risk Identification & Evaluation and work permits). Another 
manifestation of resources is the investment in employee training and education. Tata Steel 
IJmuiden is engaged in deploying a long-term program called ‘Safety Teams’ where all 
production and maintenance employees undergo a training that takes up four full-time 
weeks and which is fully dedicated to bringing attention to and getting people involved in 
safety. A more abstract manifestation of resources that should not be left unmentioned is 
‘time’. It is highlighted as a resource on its own since it is part of the tools employees are 
provided with so as to do their work safely. In the words of a middle manager: 
What we emphasize is: take your time, don’t rush things, it’s not worth it.  
Although the management is primarily responsible for safety, workers are also expected to 
take their bottom-up responsibilities seriously. The most obvious responsibility is 'abide by 
the rules', but workers are also expected to use the safety equipment that is made available 
to them, point out possible ways to improve safety, not give production priority over safety, 
and assess risky situations prior to the commencement of their assignment. Finally, several 
managers mention that they value employees who discuss rules that come across as 
unworkable, as this would allow managers to re-explain certain rules and create support or 
to make necessary adjustments. 
Importantly, the interviews reveal that in practice workers regularly disregard the 
instruction to take their time and prioritize safety over production goals, and that this is 
condoned in certain circumstances by at least some managers. Various middle managers 
talk about employees who perform or finish a task too hastily. One explanation the 
managers offer for this behavior (besides laziness, stress and frustration) is the ‘felt tension’ 
between safety and production goals, introduced when one is under time pressure. As a 
result, unsafe situations occur because employees deliberately violate the rules to get the 
job done quickly, or because they hastily start a job without assessing the risks involved. It is 
important to note that this argument contains the assumption that people would not violate 
the rules if the pressure to produce is absent. Moreover, the term ‘felt tension’ is specifically 
used by the managers, since most of them deny that they contribute to retaining such an 
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attitude or behavior in any way. Instead, they declare that they consistently convey the 
message that safety always comes first. 
Although this may hold true for daily production, some of the project managers and 
maintenance managers who deal with standstills paint a different picture. One of them tells 
that safety and production are weighted against one another: Safety requires time, while 
such delays are undesirable with regard to the timely completion of work. Another middle 
manager states that when maintenance proceedings during a standstill suffer delays, 
workers use all means necessary to make up for lost time, thereby taking extra risks. 
Because of this trade-off, one middle manager observes, behavior that is normally 
considered unsafe, is condoned during standstills. A similar remark is made by another 
middle manager, who declares that production targets do overrule safety procedures at 
times:  
We’re in a dilemma. Basically, we need to regulate safety, but as the time pressure increases, 
well…  
Finally, a middle manager describes a project he has worked on recently, where certain 
essential safety measures were deliberately not taken to prevent the unplanned downtime 
of a factory. 
The finding that safety is not always given priority over production goals is supported by the 
results of the survey among employees below middle management level. In order to assess 
compliance with the safety standards in daily work practice, we asked respondents to 
respond to 12 statements (questions 24-35, Cronbach’s α = .901), for example: ‘I always 
work safely’, ‘my colleagues always work safely’, ‘I always report unsafe situations’, ‘I follow 
all safety procedures as closely as possible’. Table 1 shows that according to a large majority 
of the respondents (88.1%) work practices at Tata Steel IJmuiden comply with the safety 
standards. Only 2.9% indicate that safety is of minor importance in their daily work. 
However, when asked about reasons to violate safety standards (questions 41-47, 
Cronbach’s α = .847), more than one fifth (21.3%) of the respondents indicate that the urge 
to complete their work faster, or personal convenience may well be a reason for them to 
violate safety standards. Finally, we presented respondents with six statements that served 
to elicit their view on whether  production goals or production pressure may negatively 
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affect safety (questions 48-53, Cronbach’s α = .861). Some of the statements read as 
follows: ‘Safety and production are at odds with each other’, ‘A higher production comes at 
the expense of safety’, ‘Safety is important, but it is actually production that comes in first 
place’. While a majority (54.5%) reject the suggestion that production may negatively affect 
safety, a substantial percentage of respondents (34.8%) agree. 
Table 1: Safety in practice (n=64) 
Construct Agree Slightly  No  Slightly  Disagree  N/A  
   (%) 
Agree 
(%) 
Opinion 
(%) 
Disagree 
(%) (%)  (%) 
Compliance with safety standards 50.4 37.7 8.9 1.9 1.0  0  
Violation of safety standards 6.5 14.8 10.6 12.7 48.6 6.8 
Production affects safety 13.0 21.8 10.3 14.5 40.0 1.8 
 
Thus, while most respondents indicate that their work practice complies with safety 
standards, the picture becomes less clear when respondents are confronted with 
statements concerning possible reasons for the violation of safety standards. Production 
pressure seems to be a strong motivator to deviate from the conviction to work safe. 
3.4. Responsibilities in reactive safety management 
The reactive stage involves the top-down and bottom-up responsibilities after a safety 
incident has occurred. Tata’s safety management in this stage is principally devoted to 
learning from accidents and other incidents in order to improve the safety level, and so 
reflects the fourth corporate ZAV principle (Zwanikken & Zwetsloot, 2012). From the 
interview data and document analysis, three types of responses can be perceived: the 
submission of a safety report, the response to a violation of safety procedures and the 
‘systematic in-depth investigation’ of an accident (in Dutch abbreviated as SDO). Safety 
reports are required for a range of incidents, they include every incident that results in an 
injury as well as certain near-misses and a loss of containment (Tata Steel IJmuiden, 2013b). 
An in-depth investigation is mandatory for every situation where an employee has suffered 
a work related injury (Tata Steel IJmuiden, 2011b), but, as several managers indicate, may 
also be carried out in case of near-misses or otherwise dangerous situations. Because such 
situations are more ambiguous than accidents, managers can decide for themselves if an 
investigation is useful.   
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Several top-down responsibilities are involved in the submission of a safety report. Safety 
reports are considered an opportunity to learn, offering the chance to prevent possible 
accidents from occurring. The management of Tata Steel therefore encourages employees 
to make such reports and makes sure that the act of reporting is as effortless as possible:   
We have a reporting system, which has been made easily accessible. We tell everyone, if you 
encounter safety related incidents […] make a report, because we can learn from it and it 
provides us with the opportunity to check if adequate measures are in place (middle 
manager).  
The management takes responsibility for providing follow-up on reports, communicating 
this follow-up to the reporter and creating an ‘open culture’. It is necessary for the success 
of this instrument that employees do not fear the act of reporting, which is why punitive 
action in response to a safety report is considered undesirable. 
When managers observe an employee violating safety procedures, a so-called ‘1-2-3-policy’ 
should be used. This three-step approach is designed to stop the unsafe behavior from 
occurring. At step one, the behavior of an employee is addressed and the supervising 
manager explains what kind of behavior is or is not expected and why. At this moment, the 
employee gets the chance to explain his actions. Step one allows for reciprocal influence: 
Both the worker and manager are offered an insight into a different perspective. If an 
employee persists with the undesired behavior, step two follows. At this stage, the manager 
has to make sure that the employee has understood what is expected of him and why. The 
second step also involves an official warning. If the employee still fails to change his 
behavior, an intervention is used (step three) to ensure that the behavior stops. Examples of 
an intervention are additional training or allocating an employee to a different task. 
The occurrence of an accident mandates managers at Tata Steel to investigate what has 
happened. As indicated before, this is done by means of an SDO: a five-phase investigation 
with the ultimate aim of facilitating improvement by detection of root causes, which are 
believed to be influenced by management decisions and omissions. An SDO needs to be 
completed and reported on within 21 days of the accident. SDO investigation teams should 
consist of at least a manager (chair), a safety expert, a technical expert, and also the 
employees that were involved in and witnessed the accident (Tata Steel IJmuiden, 2014).  
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The first phase of the investigation is called the ‘injury phase’; during this phase the impacts 
and effects of the accident are evaluated. The second step is called the ‘emergence phase’. 
It outlines the context of the situation and requires the investigator to describe what exactly 
happened. Phase three examines the ‘direct causes’, it investigates which of the acts that 
were performed eventually led to the accident. It also describes other circumstances that 
played a role in the sequence of events. The fourth phase is about investigating ‘root 
causes’. Root causes are defined as the causes of the direct causes which led to the 
accident, and are divided into personal, work-related and organizational root causes. Phase 
five is the final phase. During this last step in the investigation, root causes are traced back 
to management causes (Tata Steel IJmuiden, 2011b). The interviewed managers underline 
that looking for someone to blame does not belong to the objectives of an SDO. Rather, 
they see apportioning blame during or after the SDO-process as a threat, since fear of a 
possible sanction might impair employees’ willingness to talk openly about what happened.           
The bottom-up responsibilities are tied to the top-down responsibilities. Employees are 
expected to take immediate measures to eliminate existing danger, make safety reports, 
address unsafe behavior by co-workers, incorporate the feedback received after being 
subject to the 1-2-3-policy and cooperate with accident investigations. 
3.5. Punitive responses to unsafe behavior 
Despite the fact that Tata’s managers acknowledge that blaming employees may have 
adverse effects on the process of learning from safety incidents, many of them believe that 
punishing unsafe behavior must have a place in Tata’s safety policy. They ascribe 
punishment various functions, which may be related: affirmation and enforcement of the 
transgressed rule(s) and prevention. This is illustrated more or less explicitly by the following 
set of quotations:  
Punishment and reward, you try to find an appropriate balance between the two of them 
(top-manager). 
Punishment enforces our safety standards (senior-manager).  
Omitting a punitive response poses a risk (senior-manager).  
The safety policy cannot be allowed to become a paper tiger (middle-manager). 
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Punishment acts as a preventive measure (middle-manager).  
No wonder, then, that several managers deviate from the formal reactive procedures and 
respond to safety incidents in ways that fit the paradigm of criminalizing human error, 
namely by punishing employees when deemed appropriate. We have found no indications 
that the appropriateness of a sanction is determined on the basis of a clear distinction 
between ‘honest mistakes’ and bad intent or gross recklessness (cf. Dekker, 2012). 
Our data reveal three different manifestations of punishment: 
1. Applying the 1-2-3-policy as a sanction policy; 
2. Responding in accordance to a zero tolerance policy; 
3. Disciplinary action in response to an accident, prior to an SDO.  
First, the aforementioned 1-2-3-procedure appears to be interpreted and used by some 
senior and middle managers not as a mere safety policy, but as a sanction policy. In this 
case, the 1-2-3-policy is used as a disciplinary reaction to unsafe behavior which builds up in 
punitive intensity: (1) verbal warning, (2) written warning, (3) disciplinary action 
(punishment). Managers who characterize the 1-2-3-policy in this way expect punishment to 
have a preventive effect. 
You are giving off a signal [by punishing], ensuring that he will not show that kind of behavior 
ever again (middle manager). 
To be sure, the difference between the purely safety-oriented 1-2-3-policy and its punitive 
aberration may seem subtle. While punishment has no explicit role in the former, at least 
some of its safety-oriented measures, like assigning someone to another task, could be 
experienced as punitive. The different place of punishment in both versions of the 1-2-3-
policy is probably best characterized as unintended side-effect versus means to the goal of 
safety.       
Some of the senior and middle managers indicate that on their worksite, they use a 
different policy altogether. This so-called zero-tolerance policy involves the direct 
imposition of sanctions in response to observed unsafe behavior, possibly resulting in the 
suspension or dismissal of the employee in question. Mostly outside contractors are 
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confronted with this kind of policy, possibly because they are easier to dismiss. Proponents 
of this policy argue that employees already received enough information, explanations and 
resources to be aware of the safety standards. They consider the 1-2-3-policy an 
unnecessary lengthy process and argue it proves too difficult to implement in practice, 
whereas they find the zero-tolerance policy to be clear and consistent. 
The power of a zero-tolerance policy is that it clearly indicates: we take this seriously (senior 
manager). 
Finally, a large number of senior and middle managers state that they use disciplinary action 
in response to the occurrence of an accident. The managers realize that such a response 
would possibly counteract the learning effect of an SDO and therefore impose  punitive 
measures after a short investigation into direct causes that precedes any SDO. A middle 
manager explains this course of events as follows:  
Prior to an SDO, we look at the question of blame. You can’t do that at any other time, it 
would diminish the power of an SDO. (…) We do it this way to ensure maximum disclosure 
[during the SDO itself].  
The results from the survey confirm that employees are not subject to a uniform safety 
policy and that practice sometimes deviates in a punitive way from formal policy. When 
asked which safety policy applies in their department, 57.8% of the respondents indicate 
that they are subject to the 1-2-3-policy (answer options did not differentiate between 
safety and sanction variants), 15% indicate it to be a zero-tolerance policy and 23.4% of the 
respondents have chosen the answer option ‘other’. About half of the third group (11.7%) 
have further elaborated on their answer. Some of these respondents state that the policy 
depends on the situation and the kind of safety violation, others write that they are not 
aware of the safety policy that is currently being applied.    
4. Discussion and conclusion 
4.1. Zero Accident Vision and economic rationality 
The data show that the ideas that characterize the ZAV have permeated safety thinking and 
safety management at Tata Steel IJmuiden. Respondents paint a picture of an organization 
whose management accepts ultimate responsibility for occupational safety. Prevention 
plays a crucial role and is visible in both the proactive stage (ensuring safety) and reactive 
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stage (learning from incidents and making improvements to the system). As regards the 
debate on whether prevention will actually lead to zero accidents, Tata’s managers 
subscribe to the view that this is not a consistently attainable target, but is worth striving for 
because of its function in raising the commitment to safety and because every less 
ambitious goal is deemed ethically unacceptable. This interpretation of ‘zero’ as a necessary 
albeit utopic goal also features in the papers of Zwetsloot et al. (2013) and Sherratt (2014) 
on the corporate ZAV. The ethical consideration recurs in statements from managers at 
other companies, such as oil company Shell, whose head of Health, Safety and Environment 
in 1991 called the pursuit of zero accidents ‘the only responsible policy’ (cited in Adams, 
1995, p.16).  
Another concurrence between the findings of this study and the paper of Zwetsloot et al. 
(2013) is that the pursuit of zero accidents is not only based on ethical grounds, but also 
motivated by economic reasons. According to the management of Tata Steel IJmuiden, 
investing in safety will pay off in two ways: first, through the prevention of costs involved in 
injuries that classify as an LTI or worse, and second, through improved ‘process control’, 
which will have a positive impact on other elements of the production process as well.  
We can now answer the first question posed in the introduction of this paper: How does the 
ZAV in the private sector relate to economic considerations? Our study shows that 
managers at Tata Steel IJmuiden do not subscribe to the view of an opposition between 
safety aspirations and economic considerations that appears in elaborations of the road 
safety ZAV, but foster the belief that safety and economy reinforce each other. We suppose 
that the idea of a ‘win-win’ is characteristic for the corporate ZAV in general, because 
Zwetsloot et al.’s (2013) paper on the corporate ZAV takes the same idea and because for 
companies it seems the most attractive way of defining the relationship between the two 
rationalities. By stating that there is harmony or even synergy, ZAV-dedicated companies 
save themselves the need to formally choose between their commitment to high safety 
standards and their main goal of making profit. 
Private businesses distinguish themselves from the public sector not only by their profit-
making considerations. Another important difference is that businesses, due to their less 
comprehensive and heterogeneous character, do not have to choose between as many life-
 
Twaalfhoven, S.F.M. & Kortleven, W.J. / Safety Science 86 (2016) 57-68 
 
26 
 
saving opportunities as exist in the public sector. This means that the private sector not only 
has stronger inducement, but also less difficulty to reconcile safety and economy than the 
public sector. Elaborating on the latter distinction, it can be observed that Elvik’s (1999) 
criticism of the ZAV’s alleged neglect of economic laws loses much of its validity in a private 
sector context. Whereas invoking the economic law of diminishing marginal returns exposes 
a serious problem on the part of the ZAV in the public sector (why investing so much in 
pursuing ‘zero’ in one subsector and not in another?), this problem does not occur to the 
same extent with the ZAV in the private sector.  
Of course, this is not to deny that the economic law cited does apply in the private sector 
and begs the question whether spending as much money as necessary for reducing the 
number of occupational accidents to zero is possible without impairing the economic 
viability of companies. Furthermore, there is reason to question the corporate ZAV’s picture 
of a harmonious relationship between the rationalities of economy and safety. Our findings 
about the tension between meeting production targets and adherence to safety rules show 
that the harmony model does not entirely hold in practice, and that under certain 
conditions economic motives may prevail over safe behavior (cf. Han, Saba, Lee, Mohamed, 
& Peña-Mora, 2014). Further research is needed to determine whether and to what extent 
pursuing zero accidents and sound economic policy are actually compatible or even 
mutually reinforcing. 
4.2. Zero Accident Vision and criminalizing human error 
In section 4.1, we pointed to our finding that Tata’s management takes final responsibility 
for occupational safety. Managers argue that any  lack of safety can ultimately be traced 
back to root causes and management decisions. This is in accordance with the 
environmental hypothesis or system approach to safety. However, the acknowledgement of 
final responsibility does not equate to waiving employee responsibility. Quite the contrary: 
in agreement with Zwetsloot et al. (2013), the management of Tata feels that safety can 
only be reached if both the management and employees are involved in safety. So, the 
articulation of the ambitious goal of zero accidents is not only meant to make the managers 
committed to safety, but the workers as well.  
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In fact, Tata’s occupational safety policy revolves largely around increasing the sense of 
‘ownership’ among employees and influencing their behavior. Our data show that the 
managers’ responsibility for improving the system is  to a large extent interpreted as 
improving the safety performance of the system users. Some managers justify the focus on 
employee attitude and behavior by referring to the idea that this factor plays a role in 98% 
or 99% of all accidents (which are percentages with more rhetorical appeal than 
substantiated accuracy, cf. Swuste et al., 2010; Thomas, 2013). Although this may appear 
contradictory to the professed conviction that any accident (‘100% of all cases’) can be 
traced back to management related root causes, both claims may go together. If one 
assumes that every accident has direct causes as well as root causes, it is perfectly possible 
to maintain that the behavior of system users is almost always one of the triggers (direct 
causes) that actualize the accident potential related to the system design (root causes) (cf. 
De Winter, 2014). Acknowledging the role of human error in the realm of direct causes need 
not be at odds with the system approach of the ZAV. But the balance is delicate: Placing 
heavy emphasis on human error as a target for safety policy does not fit well with the 
systems-theoretic focus on root causes (cf. Reiman & Rollenhagen, 2014).  
This friction is clearly visible in Tata’s safety policy. Influencing human behavior has such a 
crucial place in it, that it cannot be characterized as genuinely systems-oriented. Both in the 
proactive and the reactive stage of the company’s safety management, there is actually a 
struggle for domination going on between the system approach and the person approach. 
The former has the momentum, but the latter is tough and continues to appeal to common 
sense. The influence of the person approach is most structurally felt in the proactive phase 
of safety management. As highlighted before, raising the commitment of employees and 
giving them the tools and training to do their work safely is Tata’s main strategy in this 
phase. Little consideration is given to the systems-theoretic notion that such measures 
cannot fully eradicate human error. As a consequence, the management appears to make 
less effort to increase the forgiveness of the system than one would expect of a systems-
oriented safety policy.    
 Things are somewhat different in the reactive phase of Tata’s safety management. The 
design of procedures in this phase is evidently determined by the principles of the system 
approach. Whether it comes to the submission of safety reports, the 1-2-3-policy or the SDO 
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method for investigating accidents, their formal aim is learning from unsafe situations in 
order to advance a safer work environment. Since an optimal learning process requires 
employees who are willing to actively report unsafe situations and fully cooperate with 
accident investigations, fostering an open culture where cooperation is not hindered by fear 
of punishment is deemed essential.  
This may lead to the conclusion that the person approach has no formal place in Tata’s 
reactive safety policy. Yet, in practice it has gained a foothold in the form of sanction-
oriented deviations from and additions to the policy. As we have shown in the results 
section, the 1-2-3-policy is used by some senior and middle managers as a program for 
stepwise disciplinary action, and sometimes even suspended in favor of a zero tolerance 
policy. Moreover, accidents may be responded to not only by an SDO, but also by a 
trajectory focused on the question of blame.  
Although managers defend their punitive response by pointing to its function in enforcing 
norm compliance, it obviously violates basic principles of the system approach and, more 
specifically, the ZAV. In its disciplinary form, the 1-2-3-procedure ceases to be a learning 
tool. Applying zero tolerance in response to unsafe behavior is even less compatible with 
the aim of learning. As regards the policy followed after an accident, managers’ adherence 
to the idea of an open culture appears to be half-hearted and their belief that punishing 
employees will not interfere with an SDO because sanctions are imposed before an SDO is 
started, must be considered naïve. The act of punishment still takes place in response to the 
same accident or near-miss, stands in direct contrast to the ideas that underlie the SDO 
methodology and is likely to discourage openness in general.  
Taking refuge in disciplinary action in response to either incidents or merely unsafe behavior 
also conflicts with the assumption the company makes about its employees’ intrinsic 
willingness to work in a safe manner. If this assumption is taken seriously, every unsafe act 
that does not originate in bad intent or gross recklessness should be considered 
unintentional and/or induced by circumstances beyond an employee’s control, and 
punishing unintended behavior seems irrational and unnecessary. In the cases that an 
employee who displayed unsafe behavior not already understands by himself that he made 
an error, conveying this message is possible by other means than a sanction.  
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Of course, distinguishing between unsafe behavior that is unintentional and behavior that is 
driven by bad intent or gross recklessness may be a difficult and to a certain extent 
subjective task. That does not mean, however, that attempts to draw such a line will prove 
futile (cf. Dekker, 2012).    
The foregoing discussion allows us to tentatively answer the second question we asked in 
the introduction of this paper: Do companies that apply the ZAV manage to resist the 
temptation to criminalize human error on the part of their employees? We have shown that 
the company we investigated, Tata Steel IJmuiden, does not spare the rod in responding to 
unsafe behavior of employees. Notwithstanding the company’s endorsement of the idea of 
an open environment where unsafe situations are traced down to their root causes, the 
managers also pay considerable attention to direct causes and evidently criminalize 
individual safety transgressions, without making a clear distinction between honest 
mistakes and bad intent or gross recklessness. This punitive tendency is difficult, if not 
impossible, to reconcile with a proper application of the systems-oriented ZAV. From a 
systems-theoretic point of view, it would be advisable to entirely get rid of sanction-based 
elements in the response to unsafe behavior that is unintentional, as these could hinder the 
pursuit of zero accidents.  
At the same time, we realize that it may prove difficult to follow this advice, since, 
paradoxically, incentives to punish unsafe behavior seem in part related to the ZAV itself. In 
the first place, the very ambition of eradicating all accidents possibly contributes to a 
reduced tolerance of behavior which endangers the realization of this ambition (cf. 
Dimitrova, 2014). As referred to earlier, Sherratt (2014) points in this direction by 
articulating a connection between the zero accident approach and the application of zero 
tolerance. Thus, using the metaphor introduced by Zwetsloot et al. (2013), ‘zero tolerance’ 
could be seen as another member of the family of ‘zero visions’. Although our study cannot 
fully substantiate the presumption that the pursuit of zero accidents nurtures an intolerant 
attitude toward unsafe behavior, it provides some indications, such as the finding that 
several of the interviewed Tata managers consider punishing safety transgressions as a 
requirement rather than an obstacle for achieving the company’s safety ambitions. 
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Second, the interpretation of the ZAV as dependent on ‘the personal commitment of every 
individual person in the company’ (Zwetsloot et al., 2013, p. 45) easily has the effect of 
adopting elements of the person approach, including the temptation to criminalize human 
error. It is a small step from emphasizing the importance of everyone’s personal 
commitment to holding employees accountable who do not live up to this expectation. 
These considerations warrant further inquiry into the way companies that have adopted the 
ZAV deal with human error. Ideally, a large number of  ZAV-dedicated companies would be 
investigated in order to give more empirically grounded insight into the relationship 
between ZAV and criminalizing human error. Such investigation could also provide clarity as 
to whether there are companies that actually apply the ZAV without punishing human error. 
There is one final observation to make. Even if a company explicitly excludes punishment 
from its reactive repertoire, it is possible that safety measures with no punitive aim are 
nevertheless experienced by employees as punitive measures. In other words: determining 
whether or not a company’s safety policy contains punitive elements is to a certain extent a 
subjective matter. This can be illustrated with Tata’s 1-2-3-policy. The three steps of the 
original version of this policy increase in force, but merely with the purpose of securing 
safety. When talking does not change the unsafe behavior of an employee, certain 
compulsory measures may be taken to ensure that the behavior stops. We mentioned the 
examples of additional training and assignment to another task. While these interventions 
are not meant as punitive measures, they could well be perceived as such. This is confirmed 
by Mullen’s (2004) finding that being assigned to alternative work may be experienced by 
employees as the loss of a desired position.  
The question then arises whether safety measures that are inadvertently punitive can, like 
genuinely punitive measures, negatively affect employees’ willingness to cooperate with 
incident investigations and report unsafe situations. If so, it would pose a serious problem 
for systems-thinking in general and the ZAV more specifically. Therefore, this is another 
subject that deserves attention in future research. 
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4.3. Limitations 
This study has its limitations. First, we investigated only one company. More research is 
necessary in order to establish to what extent our findings on the corporate ZAV hold for 
other ZAV-dedicated companies.      
A second limitation is that we could interview just managers, not workers. Although we got 
some insight in the perspective of workers by means of the survey, we gained no in-depth 
understanding of their experiences and beliefs. As the interviews with managers, who have 
some interest in preserving a favorable image of Tata’s safety policy, already revealed 
several discrepancies between formal policy and policy in action, it is possible that 
interviews with workers would have made the picture a bit messier. Also, they might have 
provided first-hand accounts of how the policy works out in practice and what working 
safely in an environment full of risks actually looks like. 
Third, the survey has a limited sample size and response rate, as only three of the seven 
divisions approached allowed distributing a questionnaire, the responsible managers tried 
to confine the number of questionnaires to be distributed as far as possible, and no more 
than 32% of the questionnaires were returned. This can be explained by survey fatigue (as 
managers told the first author), by managers who did not want (too much) labor costs spent 
on filling out questionnaires, and by the fact that conditions in a steel company are not 
favorable for answering a questionnaire, especially as regards workers.     
Fourth, we focused on Tata’s occupational safety and health policy, and paid no specific 
attention to process safety. Our finding that improving employee attitude and behavior has 
a crucial place in the company’s safety policy and in the pursuit of zero accidents must be 
understood against this background. It does not discount the fact that the company 
obviously also employs a variety of safety measures focused on the operation and 
maintenance of installations and equipment. 
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